This volume brings together a distinguished collection of thinkers to consider the complex relation and divergence between art and science. How art and science relate to technology, why they should be thought relevant to morality, and what their study can possibly contribute to the understanding of the nature of the mind are only a few of the subjects explored in these pages.

Eco-driving is a style of driving that minimizes energy consumption, while gamification refers to the use of game techniques to motivate user engagement in non-game contexts. This paper comprises a literature review assessing applying gamification to encourage eco-driving. The Web of Science Core Collection and EBSCO Host platforms were searched in February 2022. Qualifying sources included peer review journal articles, conference proceedings papers, academic book chapters and dissertation reports. The final sample comprised 39 unique publications, of which 34 described gamification (...) adjunct systems used during driving. Most were designed as smartphone apps, but some ran on bespoke in-car feedback displays. Alternatively, using game-based learning, 5 studies described videogames designed to encourage eco-driving. Popular gamification elements were: an eco-driving score; self-comparisons or comparisons with others via leader boards; rewards; challenges, missions or levels; and emotive feedback. One system aimed to discourage driving at busy times. While 13 studies assessed the efficacy of the various systems, these were generally of poor quality. This developing literature contains many good ideas for applying gamification to promote eco-driving. However, evidence for efficacy is largely absent and researchers are encouraged to continue to evaluate a wide range of gamification approaches to promote eco-driving. (shrink)

Lists of species underpin many fields of human endeavour, but there are currently no universally accepted principles for deciding which biological species should be accepted when there are alternative taxonomic treatments (and, by extension, which scientific names should be applied to those species). As improvements in information technology make it easier to communicate, access, and aggregate biodiversity information, there is a need for a framework that helps taxonomists and the users of taxonomy decide which taxa and names should be used (...) by society whilst continuing to encourage taxonomic research that leads to new species discoveries, new knowledge of species relationships, and the refinement of existing species concepts. Here, we present 10 principles that can underpin such a governance framework, namely (i) the species list must be based on science and free from nontaxonomic considerations and interference, (ii) governance of the species list must aim for community support and use, (iii) all decisions about list composition must be transparent, (iv) the governance of validated lists of species is separate from the governance of the names of taxa, (v) governance of lists of accepted species must not constrain academic freedom, (vi) the set of criteria considered sufficient to recognise species boundaries may appropriately vary between different taxonomic groups but should be consistent when possible, (vii) a global list must balance conflicting needs for currency and stability by having archived versions, (viii) contributors need appropriate recognition, (ix) list content should be traceable, and (x) a global listing process needs both to encompass global diversity and to accommodate local knowledge of that diversity. We conclude by outlining issues that must be resolved if such a system of taxonomic list governance and a unified list of accepted scientific names generated are to be universally adopted. (shrink)

This essay grows out of the conviction that recent work by psychologists studying human reasoning has important implications for a broad range of philosophical issues. To illustrate our thesis we focus on Nelson Goodman's elegant and influential attempt to "dissolve" the problem of induction. In the first section of the paper we sketch Goodman's account of what it is for a rule of inference to be justified. We then marshal empirical evidence indicating that, on Goodman's account of justification, patently invalid (...) inferential rules turn out to be "justified." We conclude that something is seriously wrong with Goodman's story about justification. In the second section we attempt to patch Goodman's account. The notion of epistemic authority and the social aspect of justification play central roles in the alternative account of justification that we propose. (shrink)

Recall that [Formula: see text] is the lattice of Muchnik degrees of nonempty effectively compact sets in Euclidean space. We solve a long-standing open problem by proving that [Formula: see text] is dense, i.e. satisfies [Formula: see text]. Our proof combines an oracle construction with hyperarithmetical theory.

During the last 25 years, researchers studying human reasoning and judgment in what has become known as the “heuristics and biases” tradition have produced an impressive body of experimental work which many have seen as having “bleak implications” for the rationality of ordinary people (Nisbett and Borgida 1975). According to one proponent of this view, when we reason about probability we fall victim to “inevitable illusions” (Piattelli-Palmarini 1994). Other proponents maintain that the human mind is prone to “systematic deviations from (...) rationality” (Bazerman & Neale 1986) and is “not built to work by the rules of probability” (Gould 1992). It has even been suggested that human beings are “a species that is uniformly probability-blind” (Piattelli-Palmarini 1994). This provocative and pessimistic interpretation of the experimental findings has been challenged from many different directions over the years. One of the most recent and energetic of these challenges has come from the newly emerging field of evolutionary psychology, where it has been argued that it’s singularly implausible to claim that our species would have evolved with no “instinct for probability” and, hence, be “blind to chance” (Pinker 1997, 351). Though evolutionary psychologists concede that it is possible to design experiments that “trick our probability.. (shrink)

These two companion volumes provide a comprehensive review and critical evaluation of the major DSM-III and DSM-III-R child disorders. Their major goal is to provide diagnostic and assessment guidelines that are based on scientific literature in specific clinical domains. Each chapter contains a discussion of the historical background of a particular diagnosis, definitional issues, a critical but selective review of the literature addressing the diagnosis in question, proposed changes in the diagnostic criteria based on the available literature, and proposed assessment (...) models and methods based on the designated criteria. Given the scientific bases for many of these discussions of diagnostic criteria, these two volumes will serve professionals and graduate students in a wide variety of fields: clinical child psychology, child psychiatry, pediatrics, pediatric and school psychology, special education, social work, and other child mental health specialties. (shrink)

There is a venerable philosophical tradition that views human beings as intrinsically rational, though even the most ardent defender of this view would admit that under certain circumstances people’s decisions and thought processes can be very irrational indeed. When people are extremely tired, or drunk, or in the grip of rage, they sometimes reason and act in ways that no account of rationality would condone. About thirty years ago, Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman and a number of other psychologists began reporting (...) findings suggesting much deeper problems with the traditional idea that human beings are intrinsically rational animals. What these studies demonstrated is that even under quite ordinary circumstances where fatigue, drugs and strong emotions are not factors, people reason and make judgments in ways that systematically violate familiar canons of rationality on a wide array of problems. Those first surprising studies sparked the growth of a major research tradition whose impact has been felt in economics, political theory, medicine and other areas far removed from cognitive science. In Section 2, we will sketch a few of the better known experimental findings in this area. We’ve chosen these particular findings because they will play a role at a later stage of the paper. For readers who would like a deeper and more systematic account of the fascinating and disquieting research on reasoning and judgment, there are now several excellent texts and anthologies available. (shrink)

These two companion volumes provide a comprehensive review and critical evaluation of the major DSM-III and DSM-III-R child disorders. Their major goal is to provide diagnostic and assessment guidelines that are based on scientific literature in specific clinical domains. Each chapter contains a discussion of the historical background of a particular diagnosis, definitional issues, a critical but selective review of the literature addressing the diagnosis in question, proposed changes in the diagnostic criteria based on the available literature, and proposed assessment (...) models and methods based on the designated criteria. Given the scientific bases for many of these discussions of diagnostic criteria, these two volumes will serve professionals and graduate students in a wide variety of fields: clinical child psychology, child psychiatry, pediatrics, pediatric and school psychology, special education, social work, and other child mental health specialties. (shrink)

Over the last twenty-five years, Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff have developed a groundbreaking interpretation of Marxian theory generally and of Marxian economics in particular. This book brings together their key contributions and underscores their different interpretations. In facing and trying to resolve contradictions and lapses within Marxism, the authors have confronted the basic incompatibilities among the dominant modern versions of Marxian theory, and the fact that Marxism seemed cut off from the criticisms of determinist modes of thought (...) offered by post-structuralism and post-modernism and even by some of Marxisms greatest theorists. (shrink)

Central to this essay is the understanding that varied communities may have an inherent and unrecognised culture of their own and this culture may be detrimental to their core. Bioethics constitutes one such community and is embedded in norms and values comprising its own culture. I use exclusion of religion or simply ‘irreligion’ as an example of a cultural element that may be established and so shape the culture of bioethics. Irreligious bioethics includes both overt religious preclusion and the more (...) pervasive form of religious marginalisation. This norm is narrated into the culture of bioethics with justifications sustaining it. Irreligious bioethics is inadmissible as it claims illegitimate neutrality, is a misuse of expertise and results in a variety of harms. As bioethics is influential in society, those engaged should be critically reflective and aware of harmful cultural elements whilst also possessing the honesty, courage and capacity to change them. (shrink)

Samuels and Stich explore the debate over the extent to which ordinary human reasoning and decision making is rational. One prominent cluster of views, often associated with the heuristics and biases tradition in psychology, maintains that human reasoning is, in important respects, normatively problematic or irrational. Samuels and Stich start by sketching some key experimental findings from this tradition and describe a range of pessimistic claims about the rationality of ordinary people that these and related findings are sometimes taken to (...) support. Such pessimistic interpretations of the experimental findings have not gone unchallenged however: Samuels and Stich outline some of the research on reasoning that has been done by evolutionary psychologists and sketch a cluster of more optimistic theses about ordinary reasoning that such psychologists defend. Although Samuels and Stich think that the most dire pronouncements made by writers in the heuristics and biases tradition are unwarranted, they also maintain that the situation is rather more pessimistic than sometimes suggested by evolutionary psychologists. They conclude by defending this “middle way” and sketch a family of “dual processing” theories of reasoning which, they argue, offer some support for the moderate interpretation they advocate. (shrink)

Schizophrenic hallucinations can be understood only as a function of the totality of the schizophrenic's personality, that is, only in the context of the person's entire being-in-the-world. For essential reasons, there is a predominance of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia, and these typically take the form of human voices. This paper argues that the essential reasons here are human reasons. That is, hallucinations arise primarily on account of a human or personal deficit. We argue that the deficit in question is, most (...) fundamentally, the radical one of a disturbed relation between the subject and the world in general. The schizophrenic slackens the normal "intentional arc" that casts the subject out into a world. Our thesis is that this slackening has interpersonal roots and that hallucination can be understood as a desperate attempt to compensate for the impoverishment of being-in-the-world and, specifically, for the deficiency in human relations; hence, the "human" voices. (shrink)

This chapter offers a high-level overview of the philosophy of cognitive science and an introduction to the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. The philosophy of cognitive science emerged out of a set of common and overlapping interests among philosophers and scientists who study the mind. We identify five categories of issues that illustrate the best work in this broad field: (1) traditional philosophical issues about the mind that have been invigorated by research in cognitive science, (2) issues regarding (...) the practice of cognitive science and its foundational assumptions, (3) issues regarding the explication and clarification of core concepts in cognitive science, (4) first-order empirical issues where philosophers participate in the interdisciplinary investigation of particular psychological phenomena, (5) traditional philosophical issues that aren’t about the mind but that can be informed by a better understanding of how the mind works. (shrink)

Antibodies have now been shown to catalyze a variety of chemical transformations, including hydrolytic, concerted, and bimolecular reactions. The inherent chirality of the antibody binding pocket has been exploited to exert precise stereochemical control over their catalyzed reactions. The mechanisms by which antibodies catalyze reactions are not expected to differ in any general way from those of natural enzymes. Antibodies use their binding energy to stabilize species of higher free energy which appear along the reaction coordinate or effect general acid/base (...) catalysis. The advent of catalytic antibodies promises new catalysts that extend the range of catalysis by proteins to chemical transformations that were not required during the evolution of enzymes. (shrink)

Austin Farrer is often called the one genius the Church of England produced in the 20th Century. His innovative ideas crossed a host of theological disciplines. Assessing his continuing importance and introducing him to a new generation of readers, Austin Farrer for Today brings together a stellar collection of writers to reflect on Farrer’s contribution to biblical theology, philosophy, language, doctrine, prayer and preaching. Chapters include: •Rowan Williams on Farrer as a doctrinal theologian •Morwenna Ludlow on Farrer's language and symbolism (...) •Jane Shaw on Farrer as preacher •John Barton, on typology in Farrer. (shrink)

Editors provide a substantive introduction to the history and theories of perfectionism and neutrality, expertly contextualizing the essays and making the collection accessible.

Over the past few decades, reasoning and rationality have been the focus of enormous interdisciplinary attention, attracting interest from philosophers, psychologists, economists, statisticians and anthropologists, among others. The widespread interest in the topic reflects the central status of reasoning in human affairs. But it also suggests that there are many different though related projects and tasks which need to be addressed if we are to attain a comprehensive understanding of reasoning.

This article assesses the relevance today of two different kinds of Marxism : traditional, “classical” or determinist Marxism and non-traditional or overdeterminist Marxism. These two Marxisms are compared and contrasted to show how and why they yield different notions of socialism and communism, class, the place of economics in Marxism, causation, and epistemology. The authors explain why the overdeterminist version is preferred to the determinist and what this choice suggests about a new Marxian politics for the 21st century. The latter (...) aims to yield a society with a new kind of economic freedom for workers : one in they collectively receive and distribute the gross profits they produce. (shrink)

Most recent discussion of the provocation defence has focused on the objective test, and little attention has been paid to the subjective test. However, the subjective test provides a substantial constraint: the killing must result from a provocation that undermines the defendant's self-control. The idea of loss of self-control has been developed in both the philosophical and psychological literatures. Understanding the subjective test in the light of the conception developed there makes for a far more coherent interpretation of the provocation (...) defence. It also makes clear just how radical various proposals for reform of the defence would be. (shrink)